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Abstract
The development of distributed algorithms and, more generally, distributed systems, is a complex, delicate and challenging process.
Reﬁnement techniques of (system) models improve the process by using a proof assistant, and by applying a design methodology
aimed at starting from the most abstract model and leading, in an incremental way, to the most concrete model, for producing a
distributed solution. We show, using the distributed reference counting (DRC) problem as our study, how models can be produced in
an elegant and progressive way, thanks to the reﬁnement and how the ﬁnal distributed algorithm is built starting from these models.
The development is carried out within the framework of the event B method and models are validated with a proof assistant.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Overview Developing distributed algorithms can be made simpler and safer by the use of reﬁnement techniques.
Reﬁnement allows one to gradually develop a distributed algorithm step by step, and to tackle complex problems like
the PCI Transaction Ordering Problem [9] or the IEEE 1394 Tree Identiﬁcation Protocol [6]. The event B method
[1] provides a framework integrating reﬁnement for deriving models solving distributed problems, and the main
contribution of this paper is the development of a distributed algorithm for the distributed reference counting problem.
It is a general purpose technique, which may be used, for instance, to detect termination of distributed programs or to
implement distributed garbage collection. Moreau and Duprat [17] present a distributed reference counting algorithm
and a mechanical proof of correctness carried out using the proof assistant Coq, but they do not use any reﬁnement
technique, which would help to construct the required (inductive) invariant implying the safety property if there exists a
reference to a resource, then its reference counter will be strictly positive. A second contribution relies on the analysis
of a liveness property through the reﬁnement; the event B reﬁnement states explicit proof obligations ensuring that no
new concrete event can take control over abstract ones forever; we analyse our models in order to reason about the
liveness property holding under very strong assumptions over the environment.
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Proof-based development: Proof-based development methods integrate formal proof techniques in the development
of software systems. The main idea is to start with a very abstract model of the system under development. We then
gradually add detail to this ﬁrst model by building a sequence of more concrete ones. The relationship between two
successive models in this sequence is that of reﬁnement [8,2,12]. It is controlled by means of a number of, so-called,
proof obligations, which guarantee the correctness of the development. Such proof obligations are proved by automatic
(and interactive) proof procedures supported by a proof engine [13,4]. The essence of the reﬁnement relationship is
that it preserves already proved system properties including safety properties and termination properties. The invariant
of an abstract model plays a central role for deriving safety properties and our methodology focuses on the incremental
discovery of the invariant; the goal is to obtain a formal statement of properties through the ﬁnal invariant of the last
reﬁned abstract model. When developing formal models for our case studies, we use the environments B4free [13] and
Click‘n’Prove [3] for generating and proving proof obligations.
Reﬁning formal models: Formal models, as described in this paper, contain events which preserve some invariant
properties; they also include aspects related to the termination. Such models are thus very close to action systems
introduced by Back [8] and to UNITY programs [12]. The reﬁnement of formal models plays a central role in these
frameworks and is a key concept for developing algorithmic systems. When one reﬁnes a formal model, the correspond-
ing more concrete model may have new variables and new events, it may also strengthen the guards of more abstract
events. As already mentioned, some proof obligations are generated in order to prove that a reﬁnement is correct.
Notice, if some proof obligations remain unproved, it means that: either the formal model is not correctly reﬁned, or
that an interactive proving session is required. The prover allows us to get a complete proof of the development.
The DRC algorithm: We present a complete and proved development of a distributed reference counting algorithm.
This algorithm is used to share and remove resources in a distributed way and also in distributed garbage collection.
A resource is created by a site (the owner) and can be used by other sites. The owner of a resource can remove it only
when it is sure that this resource is not used by another site. Moreau and Duprat have developed such an algorithm
and proved it using the proof assistant Coq. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the incremental construction starting
from a simple abstraction without any distribution through to a distributed and concrete algorithm which looks like
that of Moreau and Duprat. This incremental construction allows us to validate step by step the real algorithm and to
prove its correctness more easily. We conclude the reﬁnement process with an explanation on the termination of this
algorithm using speciﬁc constraints (limited messages like in [17]). The incrementation is a factor which increases the
understanding of the algorithmic method.
Summary: Section 2 introduces the event B method (set-theoretical notations, model ling language, reﬁnement).
Section 3 contains the complete development of the distributed algorithm; it contains event B models validated by
the proof assistant. Section 4 concludes the development by analysing the number of automatic and interactive proof
obligations that were required.
2. Modelling (distributed) systems
The systems under consideration for our technique are general software systems, control systems, protocols, se-
quential and distributed algorithms, operating systems and circuits; these are generally very complex and have parts
interacting with an environment. A discrete abstraction of such systems constitutes an adequate framework: such an
abstraction is called a discrete model. A discrete model is more generally known as a discrete transition system and
provides a view of the current system; the development of a model in B follows an incremental process validated by
reﬁnement. A system is modelled by a sequence of models related by the reﬁnement and managed in a project. We
limit the scope of our work to distributed algorithms modelled under the local computation rule [11] in graphs and we
specialize the proof obligations with respect to the target of the development which is a distributed algorithm ﬁtting
safety and liveness requirements.
2.1. The event B modelling method
An event has a guard and is triggered in a state validating the guard. A state is characterized by state variables, which
are allowing to observe the current state; x is the name for state variables and we use x standing for the current value
of x and x′ standing for the next values of x. Each event has a name, but an event has no input and output parameters.
An event is observed or not observed; possible changes of variables should maintain the invariant of the current model:
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Event : e Before-After Predicate : BA(e) (x, x′)
BEGIN x : P(x0, x) END P(x, x′)
WHEN G(x)
THEN x : P(x0, x) END
G(x) ^ P(x, x′)
ANY t WHERE G(t, x)
THEN x : P(x0, x, t) END
∃t⋅ (G(t, x) ^ P(x, x′, t))
Fig. 1. Deﬁnition of events and before–after predicates of events.
Event : e Guard: grd(e)
BEGIN S END TRUE
WHEN G(x) THEN T END G(x)
ANY t WHERE G(t, x) THEN T END ∃t⋅ G(t, x)
Fig. 2. Deﬁnition of events and guards of events.
the speciﬁcation/modelling style is called defensive. An event is characterized by a relation over state variables x and
primed state variables x′: a before–after predicate denoted BA(e)(x, x′). An event is essentially a reactive object and
reacts with respect to its guard grd(e)(x). However, there is a restriction over the language used for deﬁning events and
we authorize only three kinds of events (see Fig. 1). In the deﬁnition of an event, three basic substitutions are used to
write an event (x := E(x), x : ∈ S(x), x : P(x0, x)) and the last substitution is the normal form of the three ones;E(x)
is an expression over the set-theoretical language, S(x) is an expression deﬁning a set parametrised by x and P(x0, x)
denotes a relation between the value of x, when evaluating the relation and the value of x after the evaluation (x := x+1
is written as x : (x = x0 + 1)). The notation x0 is inherited from the classical B method and it continues to be useful
with certain tools which accept it. An event should be feasible: some next state must be reachable from a given state;
it may happen that a current context does not imply the existence of a required value in a given set and the feasibility
condition is intended to express this kind of situation. Since events are reactive objects, related proof obligations should
guarantee that the current state satisfying the invariant should be feasible. Fig. 2 contains the deﬁnition of guards of
events.
When using the relational style for deﬁning the semantics of events, we use the style advocated by Lamport [15] in
TLA; an event is seen as a transformation between states before the transformation and states after the transformation.
Lamport uses the priming of variables to separate before values from after values. Using this notation and supposing
that x0 denotes the value of x before the transition of the event, events are given a semantics deﬁned over primed and
unprimed variables as shown in Fig. 1.
Any event e has a guard deﬁning the enabledness condition over the current state and it expresses the existence of a
next state. For instance, the disjunction of all guards is used for strengthening the invariant of a B system of events to
include the deadlock freedom of the current model. Before introducing B models, we give the expression stating the
preservation of a property by a given event e:
I (x) ∧ BA(e)(x, x′) ⇒ I (x′). (1)
BA(e)(x, x′) is the before–after relation of the event e and I (x) is a state predicate over variables x. Eq. (1) deﬁnes the
proof obligation for the preservation of I (x), while e is observed. Since the two approaches are semantically equivalent,
the proof obligations generator of the Atelier B can be reused for generating those assertions in the B environment.
In the next section, we detail abstract models, which are using events.
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2.2. Modelling distributed systems in the event B approach
Reactive systems react to their environment with respect to external stimuli; abstract models of the event B approach
integrate the reactivity to stimuli by promoting events. At most one event is observed at any time of the system.
A (abstract) model is made up of a part deﬁning mathematical structures related to the problem to solve, and a part
containing behavioural elements such as state variables, transitions and (safety and invariance) properties of the model.
Proof obligations are generated from the model and, if they are holding, the model is said to be internally consistent.
A model is assumed to be closed and it means that every possible change over state variables is deﬁned by transitions;
transitions correspond to events observed by the speciﬁer. A model m is deﬁned by the following structure:
model
m
sets
s
constants
c
properties
P(s, c)
variables
x
invariant
I (x)
safety
A(x)
initialization
〈substitution〉
events
〈list of events〉
end
A model has a name m; the clause sets contains deﬁnitions of sets of the problem; the
clause constants allows one to introduce information related to the mathematical struc-
ture of the problem to solve and the clause properties contains the effective deﬁnitions
of constants: it is very important to list carefully properties of constants in a way that
can be easily used by the tool. It should be noted that sets and constants can be con-
sidered like parameters, and extensions of the B method exploit this aspect to introduce
parameterization techniques in the development process of B models. The second part
of the model deﬁnes dynamic aspects of state variables and properties over variables
using the invariant—generally called the inductive invariant—and using assertions gen-
erally called safety properties. The invariant I (x) types the variable x, which is assumed
to be initialized with respect to the initial conditions and which is preserved by events
(or transitions) of the list of events. Conditions of veriﬁcation, called proof obligations,
are generated from the text of the model using the ﬁrst part for deﬁning the mathematical
theory; and the second part is used to generate proof obligations for the preservation of
the invariant and proof obligations stating the correctness of safety properties with respect
to the invariant. The predicate A(x) states properties derivable from the model invariant.
A model speciﬁes that state variables are always in a given set of possible values deﬁned
by the invariant and it contains the only possible transitions operating over state variables.
A model is not a program and no control ﬂow is related to it; however, it does require a validation (but we ﬁrst must
deﬁne the mathematics for stating sets, properties over sets, invariants and safety properties). Conditions of consistency
of the model are called proof obligations and they express the preservation of invariant properties and avoidance of
deadlock. (INV1) Init(x) ⇒ I (x) and (INV2) I (x) ∧ BA(e)(x, x′) ⇒ I (x′), where e1, . . . , en is the list of events
of the model m. (INV1 ) states that the initial condition establishes the invariant. (INV2 ) should be checked for every
event e of the model, where BA(e)(x, x′) is the before–after predicate of e. Predicates A(x) in the clause safety should
be implied by the predicates of the clause invariant under assumptions summarized byP(s, c); assumptionsP(s, c) are
deﬁned from the parts sets, constants and properties of the model and they are used by the proof assistant to generate
the underlying mathematical model; the condition is simply formalized as follows: P(s, c) ∧ I (x) ⇒ A(x).
Finally, the substitution of an event must be feasible; an event is feasible with respect to its guard and the invariant
I (x) if there is always a possible transition of this event or equivalently, there exists a next value x′ satisfying the
before–after predicate of the event. The feasibility of the initialization event requires that at least one value exists for
the predicate deﬁning the initial conditions. The feasibility of an event leads to a readability of the form of the event;
the recognition of the guard in the text of the event simpliﬁes the semantical reading of the event and it simpliﬁes the
translation process of the tool: no guard is hidden inside the event.
Proof obligations for a model are generated by the proof-obligations generator of the B environment; the sequent
calculus is used to state the validity of the proof obligations in the current mathematical environment deﬁned by
constants and properties. Several proof techniques are available but the proof tool is not able to prove automatically
every proof obligation and interaction with the prover should lead to the proof of every generated proof obligation.
We say that the model is internally consistent when every proof obligation is proved. A model uses only three kinds
of events; but the objectives are to provide a simple and powerful framework for modelling reactive systems. A B
model expresses invariant and safety properties satisﬁed by state variables; the state of the current modelled system
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is observed through the current values of the state variables. An underlying global fairness assumption guarantees
that at east one enabled event is observed at any time and a trace semantics can be associated to each B model. The
correspondence between trace semantics and wp semantics is very classical and the seminal work of Park [18] led to
a wp characterization of weak and strong fairness assumptions; further results [16,14] provide elements on the link
between wp semantics and trace semantics. Abrial and Mussat [7] explain the semantical foundations of the event B
modelling language and relate them to the wp semantics.
Since the consistency of a model is deﬁned, we should introduce the reﬁnement of models using the reﬁnement of
events deﬁned as the substitution reﬁnement.
2.3. Reﬁnement of event B models
The reﬁnement of a formal model allows one to enrich a model in a step-by-step approach. Reﬁnement provides a
way to construct stronger invariants and also to add details to a model. It is also used to transform an abstract model
into a more concrete version by modifying the state description. This is essentially done by extending the list of state
variables (possibly suppressing some of them), by reﬁning each abstract event into a corresponding concrete version,
and by adding new events. The abstract state variables, x, and the concrete ones, y, are linked together by means
of a, so-called, gluing invariant J (x, y). The gluing invariant ensures the consistency between abstract and concrete
variables; the concrete events should simulate the abstract model. A number of proof obligations ensure that (0) the
initial concrete conditions should establish the initial abstract conditions and the gluing invariant (1) each abstract
event is correctly reﬁned by its corresponding concrete version, (2) each new event reﬁnes skip, (3) no new event takes
control for ever, and (4) relative deadlock-freeness is preserved. A new event (reﬁning skip) may take control over other
(concrete) events, because it may simulate the stuttering at the abstract level and it may also contradict the relative
progress property at the abstract level. A solution is to control the execution of the concrete event by a natural concrete
variable called V. Another solution would be to impose additional fairness assumptions. We detail proof obligations of
a reﬁnement after the introduction of its syntax of a reﬁnement.
reﬁnement
r
reﬁnes
m
sets
t
constants
d
properties
Q(t, d)
variables
y
invariant
J (x, y)
variant
V (y)
safety
B(y)
initialization
y : INIT(y)
events
〈list of events〉
end
A reﬁnement has a name r; it is a model reﬁning a model m in the clause reﬁnes
and m can itself be a reﬁnement of another model. New sets, new constants and new
properties can be declared in the clauses sets, constants or properties. New variables
y are declared in the clause variables and are intended to be the new concrete variables;
variables x of the reﬁned model m are called the abstract variables. The gluing invariant
deﬁnes a mapping between abstract variables and concrete ones; when a concrete event
occurs, there must be a corresponding one in the abstract model: the concrete model
simulates the abstract model. The clause variant controls new events, which cannot
take the control over other events of the system. In a reﬁnement, new events may appear
and are reﬁning an event skip; events of the reﬁned model can be strengthened and one
should prove that the new model does not contain more deadlock conﬁgurations than
the reﬁned one: if a guard is strengthened too much it can lead to a dead reﬁned event.
The reﬁnement r of a model m is a system; its trace semantics is based on traces of
states over variables x and y and the projection of concrete traces on abstract traces is a
stuttering-free traces semantics of the abstract model. The mapping between abstract
and concrete traces is called a reﬁnement mapping by Lamport [15] and the stuttering
is the key concept for reﬁning event systems. When an event e of m is triggered, it
modiﬁes variables y and the abstract event reﬁning e modiﬁes x. Proof obligations
make precise the relationship between abstract model and concrete model.
The abstract system is m and the more concrete system is r; INIT(y) denotes the initial condition of the concrete
model; I (x) is the invariant of the reﬁned model m; BAC(e)(y, y′) is the concrete before–after relation of an event e
D. Cansell, D. Méry / Theoretical Computer Science 363 (2006) 318 –337 323
of the concrete system r and BAA(e)(x, x′) is the abstract before–after relation of the event e of the abstract system
m; G1(x), . . . Gn(x) are the guards of the n abstract events of m; H1(y), . . . , Hk(y) are the guards of the k concrete
events of r. Formally, the reﬁnement of a model is deﬁned as follows:
• (REF1 ) INIT(y) ⇒ ∃x·(Init(x) ∧ J (x, y)): The initial condition of the reﬁnement model implies that there
exists an abstract value in the abstract model such that this value satisﬁes the initial conditions of the abstract model
and implies the new invariant of the reﬁnement model.
• (REF2 ) I (x) ∧ J (x, y) ∧ BAC(e)(y, y′) ⇒ ∃x′.(BAA(e)(x, x′) ∧ J (x′, y′)): The invariant in the
reﬁnement model is preserved by the reﬁned event and the activation of the reﬁned event triggers the corresponding
abstract event.
• (REF3 ) I (x) ∧ J (x, y) ∧ BAC(e)(y, y′) ⇒ J (x, y′): The invariant in the reﬁnement model is preserved by
the reﬁned event but the event of the reﬁnement model is a new event which was not visible in the abstract model;
the new event reﬁnes skip.
• (REF4 ) I (x) ∧ J (x, y) ∧ (G1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ Gn(x)) ⇒ H1(y) ∨ · · · ∨ Hk(y): The guards of events in the
reﬁnement model are strengthened and we have to prove that the reﬁnement model is not more blocked than the
abstract model.
• (REF5 ) I (x) ∧ J (x, y)) ⇒ V (y) ∈ N.
• (REF6 ) I (x) ∧ J (x, y) ∧ BAC(e)(y, y′) ⇒ V (y′) < V (y): New events should not block abstract events
forever.
The reﬁnement of models by reﬁning events is close to the reﬁnement of action systems [8], the reﬁnement of UNITY
and the TLA reﬁnement; even if there is no explicit semantics based on traces, one can consider the reﬁnement of events
like a relation between abstract traces and concrete traces. The stuttering plays a central role in the global process of
development where new events can be added into the reﬁnement model. When one reﬁnes a model, one can either reﬁne
an existing event by strengthening the guard and/or the before–after predicate (removing non-determinism), or add a
new event which is supposed to reﬁne the skip event. When one reﬁnes a model by another model, it means that the
set of traces of the reﬁned model contains the traces of the resulting model with respect to the stuttering relationship.
Models and reﬁned models are deﬁned and can be validated through the proofs of proof obligations; the reﬁnement
supports the proof-based development.
3. The distributed reference counting (DRC) problem
3.1. Statement of the problem
A ﬁnite set of sites interact in a distributed way; each site can create a resource and can use it. Our modelling does
not concretely handle resource creation and the creator of a resource is its owner. Only the owner of the resource can
delete it. The resource may be shared by other sites. However, the owner of a resource can delete it only if no other
site is using the resource. Because of the distribution of sites, the problem for a site is to have a local knowledge of the
current distributed use of its resource. This question is the main problem of the DRC algorithm, which counts (for the
owner) the number of sites using a given resource.
Moreau and Duprat [17] provide a distributed algorithm and its correctness proof for safety and liveness properties
using the Coq assistant and we summary the general process of the distributed algorithm. If a site (owner) has a resource,
another site can use a copy of the resource; hence, a site (s2 
= owner) can only obtain a copy from another site (s1),
which has already got a copy; the site (s1) sends its copy to the other site (s2 
= s1). When a site (s2) receives a copy
from a site (s1), it informs the owner that it has received a copy from the site (s1) and it sends an inc_dec message
to the owner (s1) that gave it the copy and that it can use the copy. When the owner receives an inc_dec message, it
knows that (s2) has got a copy and sends to (s1) a dec message asserting that it can remove the message sent to (s2).
When s1 receives from the owner such a dec message, it can remove the message sent to s2. A site (s1) can remove
its copy, when it has not any waiting messages which sent the copy to another site. Then, it knows that all of its sent
copies are processed by the owner. A site (s2) can remove its copy and it sends the owner a remove message, When
the owner receives this message, it locally knows that (s2) will not use its copy, but before receiving this message (s2)
can obtain another copy.
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The assumptions over the network are as follows. All messages are sent from site (s1) to site (s2) using a buffer.
Locally, a site uses a counter to get the number of messages sent to another site. The owner’s counter counts also the
number of sites that have a copy or have sent a remove message which it has not yet received. We assume that there
exists a reliable message delivery (messages cannot be lost or corrupted); machines never crash and are never taken out
of service; the entire domain is trusted. It is clear that the current development might be reused for further reﬁnements
by weakening some assumptions. The diagrams (I)–(V) describe the propagation of copies in the network. Blank sites
have no copy of the resource; the double circled site is the owner of the resource and the value c of a node is the local
value of the local counter.
(I) The site s1 and the owner have a copy of the resource and both nodes are yellow; the site s2 has no copy and it
is a blank node.
(II) The site s1 sends a copy to s2 and its counter is incremented by 1; the current value for s1 is c + 1.
(III) The site s2 receives the copy from s1 and sends to the owner an inc_dec message meaning that s1 has sent
the copy; the send message is removed.
(IV) The owner receives the inc_dec message; it increments its counter by 1 and the value becomes c+ 1; it sends
a dec message to s1; the inc_dec message is removed.
(V) The site s1 receives the dec message; it decrements its counter by 1 (c + 1−1 = c).
When the counter of a site is equal to 0, it can remove the resource and send a dec message to the owner. Both
inc_dec and dec messages to the owner may not yet have been received by the owner. The owner needs to receive
ﬁrst the inc_dec message which is the case that arises when using a buffer.
I
c
c
s1
s2
c
II
c+1
c
c
s1
s2
send
c
III
c
c+1
s1
s2
inc_dec
IV
c+1
c+1
s1
s2
c
dec
V
c+1
c
c
s1
s2
3.2. Incremental proof-based development in event B
The incremental proof-based development of a distributed solution starts with a very abstract model integrating the
essence of the safety and liveness properties. Next steps lead to the introduction of new events and/or the reﬁnement
of previous events; the reﬁnement models are validated using the tools B4free and Click‘n’Prove; each new reﬁne-
ment model adds further details to the current view of the target system. The two properties can be simply stated as
follows:
• The safety property—if there exists a reference to a resource, then its reference counter will be strictly positive.
• The liveness property—if all references to a resource are deleted, its reference counter will eventually become null.
The complete development of DRC is made up of seven models (DRC0, …, DRC6) which are related by the
reﬁnement relationship:
• DRC0 speciﬁes the view of the owner: the owner removes the resource and the environment is left unspeciﬁed.
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MODEL
DRC0
SETS
SITES
CONSTANTS
own
PROPERTIES
own ∈ SITES
VARIABLES
Rec
INVARIANT
Rec ⊆ SITES
(Rec ≠  ⇒ Rec = {own})
INITIALISATION
Rec := {own}
Rec = {own}
EVENTS
remove_own 
when
then
end
Rec  :=  
Fig. 3. Model DRC0.
• DRC1 reﬁnes the environment by introducing new events controlling the use of the resource by other nodes: the
owner removes the resource, when no other copy is in use elsewhere; it speciﬁes the propagation of copies in a global
way.
• DRC2 introduces a tree structure for the control of copies in the network; the tree structure over the network provides
a way to record the propagation of copies; the model takes into account only the last inc_dec messages which are
not followed by the related dec message.
• DRC3 is a technical reﬁnement step; in a ﬁrst attempt, we wrote a ﬁrst version of DRC4 and we were re not able
to discharge a given proof obligation; a stronger invariant was required and it lead us to an intermediate reﬁnement
model, namely DRC3.
• DRC4 introduces Moreau’s messages using the triangle (s1, s2, owner) described in previous ﬁgures; no counter is
used.
• DRC5 reorganizes the format of messages to make easier the introduction of counters in the ﬁnal step.
• DRC6 introduces Moreau’s counters for expressing the cardinality of abstract sets.
3.2.1. The model DRC0
The ﬁrst model DRC0 introduces sites, including a special one called the owner; the site owner is supposed to
propagate the resource, which is not explicitly deﬁned. This model is as simple as possible but sufﬁciently expressive
to handle the essence of the problem: the management of the resource. The goal is to state the condition or the guard
for removing the copy of the resource by the owner. The model has only one central event remove_own and a second
one stuttering for modelling the environment.
The model DRC0 (Fig. 3) is the starting point of the development and it should express in an obvious way both
safety and liveness properties; a set of sites is given by SITES and is assumed to be non-empty. A constant called own
models a given site. The site own is supposed to be the site owner of the resource. Only one state variable Rec records
the fact that either the site own has the resource (own ∈ Rec), or the site own has not the resource (own /∈ Rec). The
variable Rec is initially set to {own}, since initially the site own has the resource. Rec = {own} means that the site
owner still has the resource; when Rec is empty, the site owner has released the resource.
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The safety property—if there exists a reference to a resource, then its reference counter will be strictly positive—
is not yet visible in the model, since we have no reference counter; the abstract safety property is summarized by
the following statement: if a site owns the resource, the set ReC is not empty and contains own. DRC0 has only
one event called remove_own, which models the possible removing action by the owner, if it owns it. The safety
property is still expressed at a very abstract level, since we have not yet obtained an algorithm but we have the view
of the owner without mentioning the environment. The event remove_own may occur and we should be careful
about the conditions for ensuring the eventuality of that event. In fact, the model expresses that there is a possible
starvation of the event remove_own with respect to an environment which may behave badly. A solution would
be to control the environment, and this solution was followed by Moreau and Duprat [17] by restricting some ac-
tions of the environment. However, these actions are not yet visible at this level of modelling; but the problem is
effective.
3.2.2. The reﬁnement model DRC1
The next step is to show how other sites can obtain the resource and how the resource is managed through the
network of sites. The model DRC1 introduces a new variable REC which is intended to contain the set of sites which
are currently using the resource or a copy of the resource. Remember that the resource is shared from the site owner
and the question is to ensure that the site owner knows when the resource is released by other sites. At this step, the
information is clearly supposed to be global and the distribution will be handled later. The event stuttering is reﬁned
into two new events which simulate the propagation/release of the resource.
model
DRC1
variables
REC
invariant
REC ⊆ SITES
Rec ⊆ REC
(REC 
= ∅ ⇒ Rec 
= ∅)
initialization
REC := {own}
events
remove_own =̂
when
REC = {own}
then
REC := ∅
end
receive_copy =̂
any s where
REC 
= ∅
s ∈ SITES−REC
then
REC := REC ∪ {s}
end
remove_copy =̂
any s where
s ∈ REC
s 
= own
then
REC := REC−{s}
end
end
The model DRC0 takes into account the use of the resource by a given site called own; the resource can be propagated
to others sites, which can further propagate their copy to other sites. The model DRC1 is a reﬁnement of the model
DRC0 and it introduces two new events:
(1) receive_copy for the propagation of the resource or the reception of a copy of the resource.
(2) remove_copy for the release of the resource by a site other than the site owner.
The two events are reﬁning the environment and, clearly, provide a hint for understanding why the event
remove_own might be inﬁnitely delayed. The two new events can be alternatively executed and the system might enter
a live-lock cycle. A solution would be to require a ﬁxed number of these events in order to ensure the liveness
property.
In DRC1, the owner sees all other sites and knows what sites are using the resource; the new variable REC contains
all sites, which have (a copy of) the resource. The owner can remove its resource, when it knows that no other site has
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any copy of the resource. The invariant expresses the relationship between Rec and REC: REC contains sites which
have a copy of the resource and obviously the owner has a copy of the resource. The remove_own event is reﬁned by
modifying the guard which states a property over the variable REC instead of Rec; thanks to the invariant which allows
the validation of the reﬁnement.
3.2.3. The reﬁnement model DRC2
The next step introduces a tree structure, which we call a forest; the forest is built from the trafﬁc of messages sent
by sites propagating the resource. The variable Inc_Dec is a binary relation over sites and, if a pair s1 → s2 is in the
set Inc_Dec, it means that s2 has got the resource from s1 and s1 owned the resource. Note that Inc_Dec is not itself
a tree structure but the inverse relation Inc_Dec−1 is a tree-like structure or a forest. Roots is a new variable which is
expressing the local knowledge of the site owner; the site owner knows that the sites in Roots have the resource but it
does not yet know that the sites of ran(Inc_Dec) have the resource, since messages are on the way to the site owner.
Consequently, the variable REC is the union of both sets Roots and ran(Inc_Dec), i.e. the set of sites which have the
resource.
The diffusion of copies from the owner follows the forest structure of Inc_Dec; a site, which has a copy, can
give it to another site without copy. We do not model the sending message at this level. We model only a recep-
tion of the message, which adds a new site in the copy owner. A new variable called Inc_Dec is introduced to
model the diffusion tree and a short delay between the owner knowledge (still abstract and exact) and the diffu-
sion (through the forest) of the resource. The owner’s knowledge is the set of roots of the forest. The variable REC
is decomposed into two disjunct subsets, Roots (owner’s knowledge about copies) and ran(Inc_Dec) (the comple-
ment). The property over Inc_Dec states that it is a forest containing Roots and the assertion expresses the acyclic-
ity of the relation. Moreau and Duprat explain that the inc/dec messages give a tree structure to the node which
owns a copy. The challenge of the reﬁnement proof is to prove that the concrete guard of remove_own implies the
abstract one: (
Roots = {own} ∧
own /∈ dom(Inc_Dec)
)
⇒ REC = {own}
The reﬁnement is proved by instantiation of the variable q with the singleton {own} to deduce that REC ⊆ {own}.
All antecedents are easily discharged, because {own} ⊆ REC, {own} 
= ∅, Roots ⊆ {own} (because Roots = {own}
and Inc_Dec[{own}] ⊆ {own} (since own /∈ dom(Inc_Dec)). The events are modiﬁed to take into account the new
variables (Fig. 4).
The event remove_own is transformed to handle the new variables; the guard implies the guard of the same event
in the model DRC1. The gluing invariant helps to prove the implication.
The event receive_copy modiﬁes the forest structure, by creating a new link between s1 and s2 in Inc_Dec.
The acyclicity is preserved, since the site s2 had no copy according to the guard.
The event remove_copy models the release of a copy of the resource by a site which is a leaf (s /∈ dom(Inc_Dec)).
The event is a global vision of a removal of the copy: the copy is removed and the message is sent to the site owner.
The event receive_Inc models the reception of an inc message by the owner; a new root with a copy of the resource
is created and the forest structure is preserved. s2 is added to the set of roots.
3.2.4. The reﬁnement model DRC3
One key-point of the reﬁnement-based development is to manage the complexity of the proof obligations; when a
model is too difﬁcult to validate by discharging proof obligations, one should introduce an intermediate model which
simpliﬁes the proof process. Unfortunately, our ﬁrst attempt for the current model leads us to an unproved proof
obligation (reﬁnement of remove_copy) and it requires us to enrich the invariant. In the model DRC3, the variables
Rootsf and Own are introduced, and the variables REC and Inc_Dec remain visible and modiﬁable by the events of the
model DRC3. The variable Roots of DRC2 is reﬁned by two new variables:
(1) Own, which is empty after execution of remove_own, may contain only own; it is a concrete version of the variable
Rec in the model DRC0.
(2) ran(Rootsf) where Rootsf has a similar type to Inc_Dec. The main challenge is to prove that Rootsf−1 is a function.
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Fig. 4. Model DRC2.
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model
DRC3
variables
REC, Inc_Dec,Rootsf,Own
invariant
Own ⊆ SITES
Rootsf−1 ∈ SITES → SITES
(Own 
= ∅ ⇒ Own = {own})
Roots = Own∪ ran(Rootsf)
initialization
Roots := {own}, REC := {own}
Inc_Dec := {own},Rootsf := ∅
Own := {own}
events
remove_own =̂
when
Own = {own}
Rootsf = ∅
own /∈ dom(Inc_Dec)
then
REC := ∅
Own := ∅
end
receive_copy =̂
any s1, s2 where
s1 ∈ REC
s2 ∈ SITES−(REC)
then
Inc_Dec := Inc_Dec ∪ {s1 → s2}
REC := REC ∪ {s2}
end
remove_copy =̂
any s where
s ∈ REC
s 
= own
s /∈ dom(Inc_Dec)
then
Rootsf := Rootsf −{s}
Inc_Dec := Inc_Dec −{s}
REC := REC−{s}
end
receive_Inc =̂
any s1, s2 where
s1 → s2 ∈ Inc_Dec
then
Inc_Dec := Inc_Dec−{s1 → s2}
Rootsf := Rootsf ∪ {s1 → s2}
end
The events of DRC2 are modiﬁed to take into account the new variables and to ensure the gluing invariant.
The event remove_own of DRC2 has a sub-expression Roots = {own} which is now substituted by Own =
{own},Rootsf = ∅ according to the gluing invariant. The remove_copy event updates the new variable Rootsf,
because Rootsf is linked to Roots. Finally, the event receive_Inc models the reception of an inc message by the
owner; a new root with a copy of the resource is created and the forest structure is preserved. s2 is added to the
set of roots; in DRC3, we use the variable Rootsf to keep the information that the message has been sent. Ba-
sically, the events are modiﬁed according to the new variables and the relationship among abstract and concrete
variables.
3.2.5. The reﬁnement model DRC4
At this step, we introduce send messages to propagate copies of the resource. A site with a copy can send it, using a
send message, to another site (which may already have a copy). A site sending a copy, keeps this message in SendLoc,
until the owner asks it to remove the message (waiting message). When a site receives a send message, it can send
to the owner an Inc message, if it has no copy, or else it sends a SendDec message to the sender. When a site wants
to remove its copy, it sends a Dec message to the owner. Our SendDec and Dec messages correspond exactly to the
dec messages of Moreau and Duprat. We are now very close to their algorithm. Hopefully, all these messages can
be modelled using pairs of SITES, like in the previous abstraction. Unfortunately, a site s1 can send more than one
message to the same site s2. Moreau and Duprat solve this question by using a buffer between both sites (messages are
indexed in the buffer). Following the reﬁnement methodology, it is too early to introduce buffers in this model, because
proofs are more difﬁcult to manage automatically and interactively. The complexity of proofs is strongly related to the
complexity of data structures.
We introduce an abstract buffer which is a set in which messages are stamped by counters and this allows us to
distinguish two identical messages. COUNT is a new set of counters (or dates) and the variable count is a subset which
contains all counters already used. Each message looks like the following example (c → (s1 → s2)), where c is a
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counter (c ∈ count), s1 is the sender and s2 is the receiver. New indexed messages are generated by the new event
Send_copy. A message m (= (c → (s1 → s2))) is sent by s1 to s2 through the Send variable and it reaches the site
owner through the variable Inc; ﬁnally, it reaches s1 through the variable SendDec.
Any Inc message always arrives before a dec message and then both messages can travel to the owner. The site
owner has not yet a precise view of copies which are used by other sites. The new knowledge of the owner is stored
(as a message) in the new variable RecOwn, the abstract knowledge of the owner is included in the concrete, because
some site can remove the resource. A ﬁgure is attached to each event and sketches the scheduling of messages. s1 has
a copy but the site owner does not know that it has a copy. s1 can send a copy to s2. s2 can send a inc message to the
site owner. When the site owner receives the message, the site owner knows that it has a copy. Then, the site owner
sends a dec message to s1. When it receives it, it removes the SendLoc message.
The invariant provides typing information for the new variables RecOwn, count, Inc, Send, SendDec, Dec and
SendLoc.
invariant
count ⊆ COUNT
Send ∈ count ↔ (SITES×SITES)
SendLoc ∈ count → (REC×SITES)
Inc ∈ count ↔ (SITES×SITES)
SendDec ∈ count ↔ (SITES×SITES)
Dec ∈ count ↔ (SITES×SITES)
RecOwn ∈ count ↔ (SITES×SITES)
Each variable is used to model the following information:
(1) The variable count contains the counters currently used by the indexed messages.
(2) The variable Send contains the messages sent for propagating the resource.
(3) The variable SendLoc allows to keep locally the messages sent for propagating the resource and it plays the role
of witness.
(4) The variable Inc contains the set of inc messages sent to the owner for information on the status of the
resource.
(5) The variable RecOwn models the local knowledge of the site owner on the status of the copies in the
network.
(6) The variable SendDec is used to handle the fact that, when a site has sent an inc message to the site owner,
the owner should send a SendDec message to the site which has sent the copy.
(7) The variable Dec is used to manage the dec message.
The relation over variables is speciﬁed as follows. The range of Inc−Dec is exactly Inc_Dec and the range
of RecOnw-Dec is exactly Rootsf. Using the following safety property: REC = (Own ∪ ran(ran(RecOwn−Dec))
∪ ran(ran(Inc−Dec))), we have simpliﬁed the guards of events. We summarize the resulting invariant
of DRC4:
invariant
(RecOwn ∪ Inc)−Dec ∈ count  (SITES×SITES)
Inc_Dec = ran(Inc−Dec)
Rootsf = ran(RecOwn−Dec)
Send ∪ Inc ∪ SendDec ⊆ SendLoc
Dec ⊆ RecOwn ∪ Inc
Inc ∩ Send = ∅
Inc ∩ SendDec = ∅
Send ∩ SendDec = ∅
dom(Send)∩ dom(RecOwn ∪ Inc) = ∅
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New events for managing the messages are introduced and we used a diagram for explaining the role of several
events.
send_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
s1 ∈ REC
s2 ∈ SITES
c ∈ COUNT−count
then
Send := Send ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
SendLoc := SendLoc ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
count := count ∪ {c}
end
SendLoc
Send
owner
s1
s2
receive_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Send
s2 /∈ REC
then
Inc := Inc ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
Send := Send−{c → (s1 → s2)}
REC := REC ∪ {s2}
end
SendLoc
Inc
s1
owner
s2
receive_Inc =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Inc−Dec
then
Inc := Inc−{c → (s1 → s2)}
RecOwn := RecOwn ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
SendDec := SendDec ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
end SendLoc
SendDec
s1
owner
s2
receive_SendDec =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ SendDec
then
SendDec := SendDec−{c → (s1 → s2)}
SendLoc := SendLoc−{c → (s1 → s2)}
end
owner
s2
s1
remove_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ (RecOwn ∪ Inc)−Dec
s2 
= own
s2 /∈ dom(ran(SendLoc))
then
Dec := Dec ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
REC := REC−{s2}
end
receive_Dec =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Dec−Inc
then
Dec := Dec
−{c → (s1 → s2)}
RecOwn := RecOwn
−{c → (s1 → s2)}
end
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remove_own =̂
when
Own = {own}
ReCOwn = ∅
own /∈ dom(ran(SendLoc))
then
REC := ∅
Own := ∅
end
receive_SendDec =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ SendDec
then
SendDec := SendDec−{c → (s1 → s2)}
SendLoc := SendLoc−{c → (s1 → s2)}
end
The question is to have a complete description of the model
receive_notcopy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Send
s2 ∈ REC
then
SendDec := SendDec ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
Send := Send−{c → (s1 → s2)}
end
When a site receives a Send message, it may already have a copy of the
message and a SendDec message is sent using the following event: unfor-
tunately, our development work is not yet over. Our current model may be
deadlocked.
If we analyse guards, Inc and Dec messages are received by the owner, when the other one is not present: c →
(s1 → s2) ∈ Inc−Dec in the guard of receive_Inc and c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Dec−Inc in the guard of receive_Dec.
Hopefully, the guard of receive_Inc can be changed into c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Inc: however, in this case the reﬁnement
proof fails. In fact, another event is missing and it acts like receive_Inc:
receive_Incbis =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Inc ∩ Dec
then
Inc := Inc−{c → (s1 → s2)}
RecOwn := RecOwn ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
SendDec := SendDec ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
end
It should be noted that in the abstraction ReC (or ReCf) are found to be the effective view of all copies. In this
reﬁnement, we have a delay between the effective view and the site view of the owner.
3.2.6. The reﬁnement model DRC5
The main difﬁculties of the problem have been overcome and we modify the data structures by transformation as
follows: SendLoc messages, such as like c → (s1 → s2) are transformed into messages, such as s1 → (c → s2) of
the variable LocSend. We prove that the set LocSend can replace SendLoc and then we can use LocSend[{s1}] to get
each message sent by s1.
Invariant
LocSend ∈ SITES ↔ (COUNT×SITES)
∀ (s1, s2, c) ·
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1 ∈ SITES ∧
s2 ∈ SITES ∧
c ∈ COUNT
⇒
(c → (s1 → s2) ∈ SendLoc ⇔ s1 → (c → s2) ∈ LocSend)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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Only four events are modiﬁed to take into account the transformations over the SendLoc messages.
send_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
s1 ∈ REC
s2 ∈ SITES
c ∈ COUNT−count
then
Send := Send ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
LocSend := LocSend ∪ {s1 → (c → s2)}
count := count ∪ {c}
end
receive_SendDec =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ SendDec
then
SendDec := SendDec
−{c → (s1 → s2)}
LocSend := LocSend
−{s1 → (c → s2)}
end
remove_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ (RecOwn ∪ Inc)−Dec
s2 
= own
s2 /∈ dom(LocSend)
then
Dec := Dec ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
REC := REC−{s2}
end
remove_own =̂
when
Own = {own}
ReCOwn = ∅
own /∈ dom(LocSend)
then
REC := ∅
Own := ∅
end
The resulting model is in fact a technical intermediate model, which is more convenient for incrementally introducing
the real trafﬁc of messages.
3.2.7. The reﬁnement model DRC6
The model DRC5 results from a transformation over Cartesian products for the variable SendLoc and, consequently,
we can implement the set LocSend using a total function on sites leading to an implementation of counter. In DRC6,
LocSend, RecOwn and Own are removed, but are still in the abstraction, thanks to the reﬁnement. Each site s eval-
uates the number of send messages (in LocSend[{s}]) and own contains the sum of the cardinality of send messages
(in LocSend[{s}]) and the cardinality RecOwn. Messages (Send, Inc, Dec, SendDec) are messages of the abstraction.
When removing copy, a site s2 should know the complete information on the received messages and then it can
send a Dec message. The variable cREC plays this role. The (gluing) invariant is a simple transformation over the
previous one:
Gluing Invariant
CLocSend ∈ SITES → N
∀ s ·
⎛
⎝ s ∈ SITES−{own}⇒
CLocSend(s) = card(LocSend[{s}])
⎞
⎠
CLocSend(own) = card(LocSend[{own}]) + card(RecOwn)
cREC ∈ REC−{own} → (RecOwn ∪ Inc)−Dec
∀ s ·
⎛
⎝ s ∈ REC−{own}⇒
∃ (c, s1) · (c ∈ count ∧ s1 ∈ SITES ∧ cREC(s) = c → (s1 → s))
⎞
⎠
At this point of the development, buffers are not introduced but we can translate each event into an imperative action
by indicating the site which is locally executing the action. Each event can be a piece of the real algorithm if we give
the local site. The set REC looks like a boolean. A site s is in REC if and only if s has a copy (or is the owner). With
transformations we can easily obtain the ﬁve events from Moreau and Duprat’s algorithm.
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remove_own =̂
when
own ∈ REC
CLocSend(own) = 0
then
REC := ∅
end
However, our remove_own event is not present in their paper. This event is
the starting event of our work. In the sequel, we sketch the way to translate
events into local actions. The event remove_own is local to the site own and
the variable CLocSend is localized at own. The occurrence of CLocSend(own)
is substituted by CLocSend, meaning that CLocSend is locally deﬁned in the
site own and is a natural:
send_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
s1 ∈ REC
s2 ∈ SITES
c ∈ COUNT−count
then
Send := Send ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
CLocSend(s1) := CLocSend(s1) + 1
count := count ∪ {c}
end
The event send_copy is localized at s1 ∈ SITES; s1 sends a message
(Send(resource)) to s2. We recall that the communication medium is sup-
posed to be reliable and is managed according to the FIFO policy. The
action propagates the copy of the resource. We can use a variable resource
to express the value of the resource or copy, since s1 ∈ REC.
Events receive_copy and receive_notcopy can be combined into one
action. The local site is s2 (the sender is s1) and the condition is s2 ∈ REC.
receive_copy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Send ∧ s2 /∈ REC
then
Inc := Inc ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
Send := Send−{c → (s1 → s2)}
REC := REC ∪ {s2}
cREC(s2) := c → (s1 → s2)
end
receive_notcopy =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Send ∧ s2 ∈ REC
then
SendDec := SendDec ∪
{c → (s1 → s2)}
Send := Send−
{c → (s1 → s2)}
end
receive_Inc_and_Incbis =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Inc
then
Inc := Inc−{c → (s1 → s2)}
CLocSend(own) := CLocSend(own) + 1
SendDec := SendDec ∪ {c → (s1 → s2)}
end
Events receive_Inc and receive_Incbis are closely related; when both
events are translated, they can be combined into an event: the set Inc
satisﬁes the following property (Inc−Dec ∪ (Inc ∩ Dec)) = Inc which
is the guard of both events. The site which receives the Inc message is
the owner of the resource.
remove_copy =̂
any s2 where
s2 ∈ REC−{own}
CLocSend(s2) = 0
then
Dec := Dec ∪ {cREC(s2)}
REC := REC−{s2}
cREC := {s2} − cREC
end
Events receive_Dec and receive_SendDec are similar only the owner
receives Dec messages but always after the corresponding Inc message
(thanks to buffers). The SendDec message is sent by the site s2 and received
by s1 which decrement its counter.
receive_Dec =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ Dec−Inc
then
Dec := Dec−{c → (s1 → s2)}
CLocSend(own) := CLocSend(own)−1
end
receive_SendDec =̂
any s1, s2, c where
c → (s1 → s2) ∈ SendDec
then
SendDec := SendDec−
{c → (s1 → s2)}
CLocSend(s1) := CLocSend(s1)−1
end
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Fig. 5. The algorithm DRC.
Some events are translated into the local actions in Fig. 5 from the events of DRC6. The key-idea is to sufﬁciently
localize the events. Each site has two local variables: REC a boolean which is true iff the site has the resource, and a
counter CLocSend (∈ N). BUF is a global variable and BUF(s1, s2) is a buffer between both sites s1 and s2. Some
actions have a precondition on the buffer and First(BUF(s1, s2)) = x means that x is a message sent by s1 to s2
which is not received in the FIFO policy. First(BUF(s1, s2)) provides the message which is removed from the buffer.
4. Comments and comparisons with other work
4.1. On the proof process
The source code for the proof in Coq is approximately 13 000 lines long [17], but a similar measure, based on the
number of proof lines is not adequate for the fair comparison with the B models development. In fact, the complexity
of proofs is due to the inherent complexity of data structures used in formal models expressed in Coq. Our belief is that
reﬁnement, and the choice of the right abstraction make more tractable proof obligations generated automatically from
the text of B models. Proofs (of proof obligations) provide an objective reference or explanation that an invariant is in
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fact an inductive property. The proof assistant (Click‘n’Prove) is really used to improve the search for the invariant.
It may happen that an assertion of a given (abstract) model is not invariant (or inductive) and a proof obligation is not
discharged: either the property is not an invariant, or the tool is not powerful enough. The more complex the model is,
the more complex is the discovery of the invariant. If the user (or the speciﬁer) is not able to interpret failures of the
proof assistant, he/she will struggle. However, the reﬁnement guarantees the possibility to obtain models sufﬁciently
expressive and simple.
Reﬁnement, together with a cognitive incrementability of models, help in organizing and structuring the systematic
construction of the ﬁnal solution. The modelling of distributed algorithms is based on the classical semantical model
of non-deterministic interleaving and fairness requirements may be added to the models, like in TLA. The style of
modelling is often related to the kind of speciﬁcation language being used. For instance, the B modelling language
permits one to manipulate sets, relations and partial functions; the partiality of functions (and relations) facilitates the
development of our formal models. On the other hand, Coq provides a typed language for describing models and is
based on total functions. Coq had no automatic procedures when Moreau and Duprat constructed interactively proofs
of invariance; Moreau mentions that he spent three weeks at this time and later he redeveloped the proof in 10 h using
a more automated version of Coq. From DRC0 to DRC2, the duration for proved development is evaluated to 3 h:
the proved development includes the writing of B models and the veriﬁcation of B models; each proof obligation
is automatic or requires little interaction (e.g.: instantiation of the inductive property on the tree structure). DRC4
introduces communications which cannot be introduced separately and it explains why we have 9 proof obligations
to discharge. Proof obligations generated from B models are easily discharged. The main point of interest is that we
have distributed difﬁculties of proofs using reﬁnement. Half of interactive proofs are done on the last most concrete
model. There are technical proofs on cardinalities: reﬁnement proof such card(s) = 0 ⇒ s = ∅, x /∈ s ⇒ card(sx) =
card(s) + 1, x ∈ s ⇒ card(s−x) = card(s)−1, which can be automated, if the prover was improved.
4.2. On the modelling process
The incremental proof-based development allows us to explain how models are working; each reﬁnement step
adds new details either in the events or in the invariant. The previous invariant properties are preserved and are not
interfering with the current discharge of proof obligations generated in the current reﬁnement step. The ﬁnal algorithm is
progressively explained. The invariant of Moreau and Duprat is expressed on the whole set of variables of the algorithm.
It is thus much more difﬁcult to be proven. The majority of our ‘technical’ invariants were detected during the proof. We
thus progressed at the same time in the comprehension of the algorithm and its proofs. These even technical invariants
often provide us with better understanding of the algorithm. Our second model highlights in a simple way the problem
of termination of the algorithm. It improves the resolution of these problems by limiting the triggering of an abstract
event. In our third model, the variable Inc_Dec models exactly the set of last messages inc_dec in the buffer but
which is not followed by a message dec. Our modelling being more abstract, the required properties are much simpler
to prove. Our event remove_own, which was the only event of our ﬁrst model was not present in the algorithm of
Moreau and Duprat.
5. Conclusion and future work
Fig. 6 gives details of the number of proof obligations for the complete development; the model DRC4 is the most
difﬁcult to prove, since it required 9 interactive proofs (the main reason is that it introduces messages). If we consider
liveness properties, we understand very early that the algorithm may not terminate; in fact, in DRC1, the two new
events can take control forever and maintain the global process in a live-lock status. The proof of termination is ensured
by limiting occurrence of receive_copy event in DRC1; in DRC4, we limit the number of send_copy events and
it guarantees the control of receive_copy events. The essence of our approach is the methodology of separation
of concerns: ﬁrst prove the algorithm at an abstract (mathematical) level, then, and only then, gradually introduce
the peculiarity of the speciﬁc problem. What is important about our approach is that the fundamental properties we
have proved at the beginning are kept throughout the reﬁnement process (provided, of course, the required proofs are
done). The current development adds a new element to a library of proof-based developed (distributed) algorithms [6,5]
and further work will explore new problems of the very challenging domain of distributed algorithms. Probabilistic
distributed algorithms bring new questions to be solved with respect to the notion of reﬁnement.
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Model Number of proof obligation Interactive proved
DRC0 1 0
DRC1 6 0
DRC2 37 5
DRC3 14 2
DRC4 94 9
DRC5 19 5
DRC6 48 21
TOTAL 219 42
Fig. 6. Summary of proof obligations for the DRC development.
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